Is THIS the Century of Corporatism?

In recent months I have been working on producing amateur translations of some German-language texts on the politico-economic philosophy of corporatism. These texts date from the first half of the twentieth century, during the first great flourishing of European corporatism in Austria, Portugal, and (in its specifically fascist form) Italy. I also hope to dig into nineteenth-century sources when time permits. Why am I doing this? In myearlierposts describing the project I may not have properly articulated my reason for translating these texts. I am a novice translator, and my German skills are still developing, but this is not an academic project. My goal is not to place historical literary curiosities on display for research purposes but to aid in an effort to bring corporatism into contemporary political discourse.

Not everyone will be familiar with the term “corporatism,” and some who are familiar with it misconstrue it as meaning the rule of “big business” or the fusion of government and private industry. Those wanting a general primer on corporatism can have a look at the Wikipedia entry, but in this post I hope to offer a more precise formulation by looking at one particular, and now classic, definition of corporatism from Philippe C. Schmitter. Further, using that definition as a foundation, I hope to convince the reader that corporatism is at least worth thinking about. Of course, I know very well that if someone tries to sell you a revolutionary political idea that will solve all of the world’s problems, it is usually best to walk away. Luckily for me, corporatism does not require a revolution to be implemented, but demands only a restructuring or “righting” of our existing institutions. It is practical rather than utopian, and is based on human nature rather than on a speculative vision of the perfect social being.

For those who wish to learn about corporatism, there are two main sources: the writings of the pre-World War II corporatist thinkers, and post-World War II scholarship by those academics in political science and related disciplines who use corporatism as an analytical model through which to gain an understanding of corporatist or “corporatist-like” interest-group behaviour in modern capitalist societies. The former advocated corporatism as an ideal politico-economic system for the twentieth century, while the latter have been generally agnostic or dismissive regarding the value of corporatism. The former excelled at capturing the “spirit” of corporatism, while the latter have excelled at detailing the practical obstacles that corporatism faces in highly complex economies. Both sides of the equation must be taken into account when determining the potential value of corporatism.

Post-war academic interest in corporatism was spurred in large part by Philippe C. Schmitter’s much-cited 1974 article, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Schmitter’s careful definition of corporatism, which has served as a starting-point for much research on the subject, is as follows:

“Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.” (93-94)

This is a highly condensed definition that could use some unpacking. Schmitter’s focus is on interest-group behaviour and not political ideology—the latter is the domain of the pre-World War II advocates of corporatism. He does not restrict the number or type of interests at play, and in doing this he neglects to note in his definition that corporatism is a political idea that has focused primarily on the interests of workers and employers in the vast assortment of professions that make up modern economic life. (I should note that when corporatist thinkers use the term “profession,” they are referring not only to middle-class professions but to any type of work that requires the development of particular skills.) According to Schmitter’s broader perspective, the corporatist label can apply to a much wider variety of interest groups than just the modern guilds that corporatist regimes hoped to create, as long as these groups are “functionally differentiated” in the sense that they represent those who perform a specific function in society.

One example of a pre-World War II corporatist regime is that of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg period in 1930s Austria. The Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss proclaimed in 1934 that “Over and above the family, the constitutive principle of society is the professional occupation” (So sprach der Kanzler, 23). By “over and above” he meant “built on top of,” since Dollfuss considered the family to be the most fundamental element of human society. Dollfuss established a regime that would reinforce the profession or vocation as a social unit second only to the natural family. In a 1933 speech, he remarked:

“The professional community is one of the basic elements of human society. The society of the Christian Middle Ages was constructed upon it. In our current era, we lost our path back to the reasonable, corporate conception of profession. We want to lead society back again to corporate organization.” (24)

Austria, at the time, was being torn apart by social turmoil resulting in part from the agitation of socialists who encouraged workers to see their employers as mortal enemies. The establishment of corporations, or institutions in which employers and employees work together to protect their interests as members of the same profession, was meant to unify the nation in the spirit of Catholic social teaching. Again, scholars like Schmitter are generally not—at least in their academic work—proponents of Catholic social teaching or any other social philosophy, but they are similarly focused on the organization of professional interest groups.

The other elements of Schmitter’s definition help to flesh out the characteristics of interest groups under corporatism, and we can interpret these in relation to the traditional concept of the professional corporation. Such interest groups are “singular” and “noncompetitive,” meaning that each profession can only be represented by one corporation; they are “compulsory,” meaning that one may only engage in a profession through membership in the corporation that represents it; and they are “hierarchically ordered,” meaning that members must, in some fashion, earn status and responsibility within the profession. The last part of Schmitter’s definition describes the trade-off that cements the status of the corporation: the government grants a “representational monopoly” to each interest group (through licensing), and in exchange, the interest group must follow certain government-prescribed rules of operation.

Elsewhere in his essay on corporatism, Schmitter provides definitions of three other systems of interest-group representation: pluralism, monism, and syndicalism. Pluralism is the most dominant system of interest-group representation in the West. In a pluralist system, interest groups are “multiple, voluntary, competitive, [and] nonhierarchically ordered” (96), and are not regulated by the state. Monist systems are of the type once found in the Soviet Union (97). Syndicalism, as I would describe it, is a sort of headless corporatism of the type found in the speculative visions of political anarchism or certain brands of unorthodox socialism.

Schmitter’s definition of corporatism, although it may lack the political punch of post-World War II understandings of corporatism, and although it was formulated as a tool for analysis and not for any political programme, is admirably precise and allows those who advocate corporatism to move beyond unlikely dreams of reorganizing society from above. This is important, since in proposing that we look to corporatism for solutions to some of our political problems, I am not advocating the sudden imposition of an anachronistic system of government on the medieval or fascist models. What is valuable in the writings of Othmar Spann or the speeches of Engelbert Dollfuss is the attention they give to the spiritual dimensions of corporatism, while what is valuable in the writings of political scientists like Schmitter is the attention they devote to how corporatist structures function within the complex realities of modern economic life. The soul of corporatism lies in Catholic social teaching, but its implementation need not be rigid or authoritarian to the extent that it would require the kind of aggressive coercion that would stifle the vibrancy of a market economy. Its introduction into political life could be gradual, and, as corporatist scholars argue, corporatist-like structures are already present in some modern economies. With this more careful approach in mind, it may also be best to follow Schmitter’s lead and modify his original definition of corporatism as a type of “interest representation” to a definition of corporatism as a type of “interest intermediation” (see Schmitter’s follow-up essay, “Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe”). Certainly, the latter term better captures the ethic of corporatism, which should be more mediatory than prescriptive.

There is much more I could say, but for now I will offer one example of a way that corporatism could provide a potential solution to a current social and economic problem. In Canada we are facing a ‘jobs’ crisis. Every year, our colleges and universities produce far more graduates than can be employed in a shrinking number of middle-class occupations, while at the same time, many employers complain that they can’t find skilled workers. Broadly speaking, the worlds of training and employment have separated, as would be expected in a predominantly pluralist system. The various employment sectors, as well as the many universities and other educational institutions that supply them with educated workers, have to a large extent become enclaves of interest, communicating with each other only when necessary. Although each enclave is able to protect its own interests, the interests of the nation are not served and our employment landscape has become one of profound waste and mismatch.

Let’s suppose that within Canada we could create corporations, or state-licensed ‘intermediary’ institutions representing the major professions. These institutions would be similar in some respects to existing professional associations that provide accreditation for select college or university programs, but they would be far greater in number and have more power to coordinate the interests of labour, management, and government within each profession. The corporations, in exchange for the power they have been granted, would sponsor or officially approve any programs in our colleges or universities that meet the standards required by that particular profession. They would have some say in the control of admission numbers, which would help avoid the overproduction of graduates, and also provide a link through which co-op opportunities and apprenticeship programs could be arranged. University or college staff and faculty could communicate with management through the corporation in order to stay on top of new economic or technological developments. The universities could also arrange, through the corporations, to provide online or in-person extended education programs to encourage skill development among those already employed in the profession. Non-approved educational programs in colleges and universities would still exist, of course, but they would become less attractive for those pursuing education as a path to a career. Bachelor of Arts programs would shrink to a size more in keeping with the genuine demand that exists for liberal arts education.

Is this not a reasonable solution? Would it require the imposition of an economic dictatorship, or could it be implemented gradually as a practical solution to existing problems? Those are questions that the existing scholarship on corporatism, much of which is in English, can help answer. But what would the effect be on our society, and particularly on the wellbeing of young people looking to find careers and raise families, if we could implement such a solution? Those are questions that can only be answered by thinkers like Othmar Spann and visionary leaders like Engelbert Dollfuss, and that is why their ideas must be recovered and reclaimed.

Schmitter, Philippe C. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics. 36:1 (January 1974): 85-131.

Schmitter, Philippe C. “Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe.” Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. Eds. Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1979. 63-94.

So sprach der Kanzler. Ed. Anton Tautscher. Vienna: Ferdinand Baumgartner, 1935. See the Translation Project page for the translation-in-progress.

Our Inversional Culture: The New Ontario Sex-Ed Curriculum

“The ‘homo’ is the legitimate child of the ‘suffragette.'” – Wyndham Lewis, 1926

I’ll begin this post with a relevant quotation from Wyndham Lewis (not to be confused with his much milder contemporary D.B. Wyndham Lewis), taken from his 1926 work of political analysis, The Art of Being Ruled. The passage speaks to the problems that Ontarians are facing as radical feminism, rekindled by gender theory and LGBTTIQQ2S (or whatever) activism, becomes more and more an essential element of Canadian public policy. Such activist theory has recently crept into Ontario’s new Health and Physical Education curriculum, which unfortunately must be followed in both public and Catholic elementary schools and high schools. (The curriculum is normally available here but the government site is down for some reason.)

Keep in mind that Lewis’s prophetic quote is from a book published almost ninety years ago.

“Now what really is happening today (and this will continue until the full circle of social revolution has been described) is that the opposite of the initiatory ceremonies of puberty, universal amongst primitive people, are performed. The puberty ceremony of primitive life was directed to separating the adolescent male from the women and children (with whom up to then he had lived) for ever. Simultaneously he became a ‘tribesman,’ and was initiated into the ceremonies over which the male leaders of the tribe presided. Today at the age of puberty, or indeed long before, the child receives, and is destined more and more to receive, an intensive ritualistic teaching opposite in its aim: namely, away from the traditions of the tribe and its traditional rulers. He, he is told, is henceforth the ruler. (This in effect would be the rule not by childhood, of course, but by the mentor or teacher, the dominy, and by the queen-mother, sitting upon an ideologic matriarchal throne.)” (Lewis 253-54)

Lewis is describing the development of our inversional culture; this development started long ago—it’s not even remotely new. Even in the Britain of 1926, traditional families and communities were already being turned inside out and transformed according to the logic of “social revolution.” Lewis saw the coming of the man-child, the teacher-ruler, and the ideological matriarch. Under such a system, the child (and especially the male child) is forced to remain a child indefinitely with a sexual drive that has been stunted and misdirected by what is indeed “an intensive ritualistic teaching.” This teaching is ritualistic in the sense that it demands participation and repetitive acts of affirmation. All of us are part of the ritual, in some sense, in that we are daily assaulted by the percussive messaging of feminism and gay rights; it commands us to conform, against every natural instinct.

Ontario’s ideological matriarch is Premier Kathleen Wynne, and her Ministry of Education is her hive of teacher-rulers. That being said, I don’t think she is the head of any conscious conspiracy to sow moral chaos. I doubt she thinks that what she’s doing is controversial at all. As you can tell from her grating smile and DeGenerestic spunk, her eyes are filled with rainbows and she genuinely believes she is on the side of the angels.

The problem with the new curriculum is not its explicitness. The problem is that it seeks to enshrine, within our school systems and within the minds of young Canadians, a warped sense of sexuality and gender. To show this, I’ll highlight several of the key elements of the ‘teaching’ contained in the curriculum. I’ll try to do this without hyperbole, so as to avoid the usual accusation that anyone who objects to the curriculum is a prudish bigot.

Element 1: the usual (for sex-ed) sterilization of the topic of sexuality

As in the past, the curriculum treats reproductive organs as if they are mere pleasure-organs that must be handled carefully so as to avoid disease or pregnancy. Never mind that the purpose of these organs is, first and foremost, the creation of new life. The idea of sex as consummation is ignored, as is any connection between sex and marriage. The new guidelines even discourage children from using the terms “husband” and “wife,” except in situations where those terms are approved as being appropriate.

Element 2: the separation of sex (as biology) and gender (as social construct)

The new curriculum confidently treats gender as a social construct when in fact the boundaries between nature and nurture in gender expression are not at all clear. (Indeed, the document contradicts itself when it describes “gender identity,” in a sample Grade 5 student response, as one of the “things I cannot control.” If gender identity is a social construct, it is not an unchangeable essence.) The stark sexuality/gender divide allows for a distinction between gender identities (“e.g., male, female, two-spirited, transgender, transsexual, intersex”) and sexual orientation (“e.g., heterosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual”). How is an elementary school student supposed to use this model of sexuality and gender as a guide when it is based on confused activist theory rather than fact? Why not simply explain that most people are either male or female in both sex and gender although there are many variations from the norm?

Element 3: quantitative relativization

In the lists of available options for gender identity quoted above, we see a technique characteristic of the Marxist intellectual habitus which we might refer to as quantitative relativization. A category of human identity—in this case gender—is identified, and the spectrum of possible sub-categories is mapped out. What is crucial is that the sub-categories be listed without any reference to their actual distribution in human societies. Anyone who doesn’t spend all their time on the Internet or on university campuses knows that the overwhelming majority of people on Earth identify as either male or female (and are also “cisgendered,” to borrow a noxious term from gender theory that applies to anyone whose mode of gender expression corresponds to their biological sex), while a very small minority identify as “two-spirited, transgender, transsexual, intersex,” and so on. Yet male, female, two-spirited, transgender, transsexual, and intersex are presented in the curriculum as simple categories stripped of any quantitative data that would show the distribution of each. They are all granted equal status.

One example may demonstrate the absurdity of this type of thinking. Imagine that you are a father whose daughter is a late teenager. You decide that it’s about time she learned how to drive a vehicle. You know that there are two main types of vehicles on the road: cars (and in this category I would include SUVs and four-wheeled trucks) and motorcycles. The overwhelming majority of people drive cars, while only a small fraction of people drive motorcycles, which are more dangerous and less versatile than cars. Would you tell your daughter, “It’s about time you learned to how to drive a car or motorcycle”? No—you would tell her it’s time she learned how to drive a car. In the unlikely case that she has always dreamed of driving a motorcycle and has no interest in driving a car, you can warn her of the dangers and limitations of motorcycles and negotiate the situation from there. The motorcycle option is a special case outside the norm. In the same way, “two-spirited, transgender, transsexual, [and] intersex” gender identities are outside the norm and should be treated as special cases. Do we need to present these gender identities to children, who are awkwardly discovering their sexuality, like options at a buffet? Are male and female gender identities just two possible options among many?

Element 4: the characterization of morality as “private”

The curriculum treats morality as something relative and private and replaces it with a resolutely liberal ethical framework. Ideas of right and wrong are ignored; what matters is whether the child is able to develop a unique “self concept” and gain emotional support from similarly-oriented role-models and allies. The child is left without any means of determining what might make one self-concept better than another, except for the golden rule that one’s self-concept must not lead to intolerance toward the self-concepts of others.

The curriculum says, “A moral consideration is what you believe is right or wrong. It is influenced by your personal, family, and religious values.” Ok, fine. But then it continues with the non-sequitur that “Every person in our society should treat other people fairly and with respect.” In other words, the ethics of fairness and respect trumps morality. This would only make sense if morality could be separated from ethics, which is impossible.

Element 5: the exclusion of references to Christian traditions or teachings, although other cultural/religious traditions are mentioned

Regarding religion, the document manages to incorporate references, in the context of puberty, to Jewish (bar mitzvah and bat mitzvah) and Aboriginal traditions (rites of passage), but none to Christian or Islamic traditions. Why?

Element 6: the representation of masturbation as harmless

The curriculum states, “Exploring one’s body by touching or masturbating is something that many people do and find pleasurable. It is common and is not harmful and is one way of learning about your body.” While even the Catholic Church is lenient regarding masturbation when it comes to teenagers, there is a big difference between saying “no, it won’t make you go blind” and “it is common and is not harmful.” Chronic masturbation can lead to all sorts of harm. It can make one turn away from healthier expressions of sexuality, and it can easily lead to the use of pornography. Our culture, in many ways, has become not only inversional but also masturbatory and voyeuristic.

Summary

There are fundamental flaws in this new curriculum that make it unsuitable for use in both public and Catholic schools. Many of the opponents of this new curriculum are religious people, but the curriculum also undermines traditional secular understandings of sexuality and gender and should be of concern to non-religious people as well. This curriculum should be rejected and replaced with one that would encourage tolerance of those with sexual orientations or gender identities outside the norm without obliterating traditional concepts of sexuality and gender.

Lewis work cited:

Lewis, Wyndham. The Art of Being Ruled. Ed. Reed Way Dasenbrock. Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1989. First published 1926.